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Abstract
In this paper the fairness of some methods of allocating seats in a proportional represen-
tation (PR) voting system is investigated. Different PR systems are in use throughout the
democratic world, but the primary focus here is the method used in South Africa, namely
the largest remainder method with a Droop quota. It is shown that as the number of parties
increases, the number of lost votes (votes not used to allocate seats) increases when using this
method. Other existing allocation methods are discussed and compared with each other as
well as with three optimisation methods (based on mathematical programming) introduced
in this paper. Applying these mathematical programming methods results in allocations that
are more fair than the existing methods of seat allocation, if South African voting data are
used. These mathematical models attempt to minimise a number of different measures of
the deviation between the actual percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats
allocated to a certain party. Ideally this deviation should be zero, but due to the discrete
nature of seats this is virtually impossible to achieve.
Key words: Proportional representation, seat allocation, integer programming, quadratic program-
ming.
1 Introduction
Proportional representation (PR) systems are a family of voting systems used in multiple-
winner elections. The principle behind PR elections is that every vote deserves its rep-
resentation in government and each political party involved should be represented in the
legislature in proportion to its strength in the electorate. Essentially, this means that
each party should receive the same percentage of representation as the percentage of votes
received. All PR systems set out to achieve this objective. In typical PR systems there
are multi-member districts [1]. These districts may vary in size, as is the case in South
Africa, where no two of the nine provinces are equal in size. Seats in these districts are
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allocated proportionately to the percentage of votes received in that particular district.
Thus, if a party receives 30% of the votes, 3 out of 10 seats should be allocated to that
party. The challenge in PR systems is to translate the electoral votes into seats in the same
proportion as the actual votes received. Seat allocations are integer numbers, whilst the
number of votes may be considered as continuous quantities in comparison to the number
of seats. Therefore, the translation of the number of votes into the number of seats nearly
always involves adjustment methods. The objective from an operations research point of
view is to minimise some measure of the deviation between the actual percentage of votes
cast and the percentage of seats allocated to the different parties.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. A brief discussion of commonly used
methods to allocate seats in PR systems follows in §2. In §3 the method used in South
Africa is investigated in some detail. Results from simulations are provided to support
the two main theorems describing the effect of an increase in the number of parties on
the total absolute deviation of a district. Three mathematical programming models based
on mixed integer programming are introduced in §4. A comparative case study, where
different methods are applied to the actual South African electoral results from the 1999
and 2004 national elections, is discussed in §5. Finally, in §6 brief concluding remarks on
the results obtained and ideas for further study are given.
2 A short overview of existing seat allocation methods
Different methods of allocating seats after votes have been counted are in use all over the
democratic world. The vast majority of democratic countries use some form of proportional
representation. Some of the few exceptions are France, the UK and some of its former
colonies, such as the USA, Canada and India [2]. All the different PR systems used today
fall into one of two categories, namely highest average (or divisor) methods or largest
remainder (or quota) methods [6].
2.1 Highest averages methods
A highest average method requires that the number of votes for each party is divided
successively by a series of divisors. Seats are then allocated to parties with the highest
resulting quotient until all the seats available are allocated. Two highest average methods,
namely the d’Hondt method and the Sainte-Lague¨ method, are the most commonly used
[9] and are considered in this paper.
2.1.1 The d’Hondt method
Some of the countries using the d’Hondt method are Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile,
Croatia, Finland, Israel, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey [15]. The
method works as follows. Successive quotients for each party are calculated. The formula
for the quotient is given by Visi+1 , where Vi is the total number of votes received in favour
of party i and si is the number of seats that has been allocated to a specific party (party i)
so far. Initially si is set to zero for all the parties. The party with the highest quotient
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is allocated the next seat and the quotient is recalculated with si increased by one. This
process is repeated until all the seats have been allocated. d’Hondt’s method to allocate
6 seats to 5 parties is shown in Table 1. The numbers in bold indicate where the seat has
been allocated.
Seat allocation
Party A Party B Party C Party D Party E Party F
Vi 40 000 23 000 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
1st seat 40 000 23 000 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
2nd seat 20 000 23 000 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
3rd seat 20 000 11 500 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
4th seat 13 333 11 500 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
5th seat 13 333 11 500 8 250 13 000 9 000 3 200
6th seat 10 000 11 500 8 250 13 000 9 000 3 200
Total seats 3 1 1 1 0 0
Table 1: An illustration of d’Hondt’s method of allocating seats proportional to votes.
2.1.2 The Sainte-Lague¨ method
Sainte-Lague¨’s method is also known as Webster’s method or the divisor method with
standard rounding. This method is used in New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, Hamburg and Bremen [17]. The successive quotients
for each party are calculated similar to d’Hondt’s method, but the formula Vi2si+1 is used
instead. In this formula Vi is the total number of votes cast in favour of party i and si
is the number of seats that has been allocated to party i so far. If no seats have been
allocated, then si = 0 for all the parties. The party with the highest quotient is allocated
the next seat and the quotient is recalculated for that party with the value of si increased
by one. This process is repeated until all the seats have been allocated. Some countries,
such as Sweden and Denmark, use a modified version by replacing the first divisor with 1.4
[17]. An illustration of how the seats are allocated by means of the Sainte-Lague¨ method
can be found in Table 2. The same votes as in Table 1 are used. The seat allocation with
the modified version of Sainte-Lague¨’s method is given in Table 3. The modified version
of the Sainte-Lague¨ method gives exactly the same seat allocation as d’Hondt’s method,
while the normal Sainte-Lague¨ method gives a different allocation of the seats.
Seat allocation
Party A Party B Party C Party D Party E Party F
Vi 40 000 23 000 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
1st seat 40 000 23 000 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
2nd seat 13 333 23 000 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
3rd seat 13 333 7 667 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
4th seat 13 333 7 667 5 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
5th seat 8 000 7 667 5 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
6th seat 8 000 7 667 5 500 4 333 9 000 3 200
Total seats 2 1 1 1 1 0
Table 2: An example of the seat allocation by means of the Sainte-Lague¨ method.
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Seat allocation
Party A Party B Party C Party D Party E Party F
Vi 40 000 23 000 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200
1st seat 28 571 16 429 11 786 9 286 6 429 2 286
2nd seat 13 333 16 429 11 786 9 286 6 429 2 286
3rd seat 13 333 7 667 11 786 9 286 6 429 2 286
4th seat 8 000 7 667 11 786 9 286 6 429 2 286
5th seat 8 000 7 667 5 500 9 286 6 429 2 286
6th seat 8 000 7 667 5 500 4 333 6 429 2 286
Total seats 3 1 1 1 0 0
Table 3: An example of the seat allocation by means of the modified Sainte-Lague¨ method.
2.2 Largest remainder methods
The largest remainder methods (LR methods) are the other class of allocation methods.
This method requires that each party’s votes are divided by a quota, which represents the
number of votes required for a seat. A notional number of seats is given to each party.
This seat allocation typically includes an integer part and a remainder part. Each party
receives the number of seats equal to the integer value. Generally this will leave some
seats unallocated. The parties are then ranked on the basis of descending remainders.
The parties with the largest remainders are allocated one additional seat until all the
seats have been allocated. Several possibilities exist to determine the quota. The Hare
quota and the Droop quota are the most common [16].
The Hamilton method of allocation is specifically defined as using the Hare quota. It is
used in Namibia and Hong Kong [16]. The Hare quota, Hq, is defined as
Hq =
total votes
total seats
.
The Droop quota, Dq, is applied to elections in South Africa and is defined as
Dq = 1 +
⌊
total votes
1 + total seats
⌋
, (1)
where bxc denotes the largest integer smaller than or equal to x.
The Imperiali quota, Iq, is a third kind of quota, but is rarely used since it may happen
that more candidates are elected than the number of seats that are available when using
this method. This quota is given by
Iq =
total votes
2 + total seats
.
Examples to illustrate the working of the LR methods (using Droop and Hare quotas
respectively) are shown in Tables 4 and 5. In both cases ten seats are to be allocated to
six parties.
Schuster et al. (2003) indicate in their study that the d’Hondt method is biased towards
larger parties, while Sainte-Lague¨ is considered less biased. The difference in seat allocation
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Seat allocation
Party A Party B Party C Party D Party E Party F Total
Vi 40 000 23 000 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200 104 700
Votes / quota 3.820 2.197 1.576 1.242 0.860 0.306
Automatic seats 3 2 1 1 0 0 7
Remainder 0.820 0.197 0.576 0.242 0.860 0.306
Largest rem. seats 1 0 1 0 1 0 3
Total seats 4 2 2 1 1 0 10
Table 4: Allocation of seats using the Hare quota. In this table 10 seats should be allocated,
which implies a Hare quota of 10 470.
Seat allocation
Party A Party B Party C Party D Party E Party F Total
Vi 40 000 23 000 16 500 13 000 9 000 3 200 104 700
Votes / quota 4.202 2.416 1.733 1.366 0.945 0.336
Automatic seats 4 2 1 1 0 0 8
Remainder 0.202 0.416 0.733 0.366 0.945 0.336
Largest rem. seats 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
Total seats 4 2 2 1 1 0 10
Table 5: Allocation of seats using the Droop quota. In this table 10 seats must be allocated,
which implies a Droop quota of 9 519.
can be observed in the respective examples, where d’Hondt’s allocated 3 seats to the
largest party compared to the normal Sainte-Lague¨ method which allocated two seats. The
modified version of the Sainte-Lague¨ method, like d’Hondt’s method, tends to favour the
largest party, as seen in the example. Schuster et al. (2003) also revealed that, contrary to
popular belief, LR methods as a family are relatively unbiased towards any party. Their
study, however, concentrates on the LR method using the Hare quota. Furthermore,
Schuster et al. (2003) mention that the different quotas tend to be biased towards some
parties in certain situations, but on average no party gains a significant advantage or
disadvantage by using any of these methods. The topics of fairness and bias of allocation
methods have not been studied in great detail in the operations research literature. The
two papers available are by Ernst (1994) and Oyama & Ichimori (1995).
3 Allocation of seats in South Africa
Currently, South Africa uses the LR method with the Droop quota (LRMD) [3, 4]. Recent
elections in South Africa have been dominated by one party, which logically received the
majority of the seats. Another typical phenomenon in South African elections is the large
number of parties participating in the elections. The majority of these parties receive
almost no votes, i.e. less than 1% of the votes. Furthermore, there are almost no medium-
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sized parties, i.e. parties with approximately 20% of the votes. It is known from other
experimental studies that most of the known allocation methods tend (in various degrees)
to be unfair and usually favour the larger parties [13]. It remains a question whether this
pattern of voting influences the fairness of seat allocation. Another question that is often
raised in the South African media is whether the large number of small parties favours the
larger party or not. To answer these questions a closer investigation of the LR method
using the Droop quota is necessary.
From (1) it follows that
Dq = 1 +
⌊
V
1 + S
⌋
,
where Dq is the Droop quota, V is the total number of votes and S is the total number of
seats. The number of automatic seats mi for party i is then given by
mi =
⌊
vi
Dq
⌋
, (2)
where vi is the number votes for party i. If
P∑
i=1
mi =M < S,
then the last S −M = R seats are allocated to the R parties with the largest remainders.
The following theorem shows that, in general, the potential number of seats allocated from
the remainders (R) increases as the number of parties increases.
Theorem 1
The maximum number of seats allocated from the remainder, R, increases as the number
of parties increases, that is
0 . R . P − 2,
where P is the number of parties and . denotes approximately less than or equal to.
Proof: From (2), the number of seats automatically allocated is
mi =
⌊
vi
Dq
⌋
.
It follows that
vi
Dq
= mi + Fi, i = 1, . . . , P (3)
and
0 ≤ Fi < 1, i = 1, . . . , P. (4)
If the sum over all parties is taken in (3), it follows that
1
Dq
P∑
i=1
vi =
V
Dq
=
P∑
i=1
mi +
P∑
i=1
Fi.
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From (1) we can show that (
V
S + 1
)
+ 1 ≥ Dq ≥ V
S + 1
. (5)
Equation (5) may be rewritten as
(S + 1) ≥ V
Dq
≥ (S + 1)
(
1− 1
Dq
)
.
If Dq is sufficiently large (this means that V must be substantially larger than S, which
is usually the case), it means that
V
Dq
≈ S + 1.
This result implies that
P∑
i=1
mi +
P∑
i=1
Fi ≈ S + 1, (6)
which means that
∑P
i=1 Fi will approximately be an integer value. If (4) is summed over
all the parties and used together with (6), the approximate bounds for the sum of the
remainders are given by
1 .
P∑
i=1
Fi . P − 1. (7)
In general we know thatM +R = S. If this is used in conjunction with (6), it follows that
P∑
i=1
Fi ≈ R+ 1. (8)
By substituting (8) back into (7) the result stated in the theorem is obtained as
0 . R . P − 2. 
A simulation was performed for 6 000 random elections to determine the probability that
a certain number of seats will be unallocated for a certain number of parties. In the
simulation 100 seats were allocated using LRMD. It is interesting that the probability of
R taking on a certain value is not the same, i.e. P (R = 1) 6= P (R = 2) 6= P (R = 3) . . .
From the simulation it follows that R has a hypergeometric distribution with an expected
value of
E(R) =
P − 2
2
.
This implies that the expected number of remainders, Ar, not used to allocate seats is
given by
E(Ar) = P − P − 22 .
This result hints that, on average, the number of lost votes increases with an increase in
the number of parties. Thus, on average, more votes will not be used to allocate seats
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Figure 1: The distribution of the number of seats allocated from the remainders.
if the total number of votes is scattered over more parties. This result is formalised in
Theorem 2 and is indeed echoed by the simulation results shown in Figure 1. It is more
convenient to express the number of lost votes, i.e. votes that are not used to allocate
seats, in terms of the number of lost seats. The basic problem that arises when working
with lost votes is that the weight (influence) of one vote differs with respect to the total
number of votes counted. This gives rise to the term vote-seats. The number of vote-seats
is defined as the number of lost votes divided by the quota.
Theorem 2
1 ≤ maximum number of vote-seats ≤

(k + 1)2
2k + 1
if P = 2k + 1
k + 1
2
if P = 2k
for some k ∈ N, where vote-seats is the number of lost votes expressed in terms of seats.
Proof: From (8) it follows that the average fraction (remainder) is approximated by
1
P
[
P∑
i=1
Fi
]
≈ R+ 1
P
,
where P represents the number of parties, or in this case the maximum number of remain-
ders, and R is the number of seats allocated using the remainders. The maximum number
of vote-seats (not allocated because the remainders are too small) as a function of R is
then given by
f(R) = (P −R)
(
R+ 1
P
)
.
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The actual number of vote-seats will always be less than or equal to f(R). The first and
second derivatives of f(R) are
f ′(R) = − 1
P
(2R− P + 1) and f ′′(R) = − 2
P
,
respectively. The second derivative will always be negative. The maximum of this function
will thus occur at
R =
P − 1
2
,
if both P and R are integers. Different results are obtained when P is an odd or an even
number.
P odd: In this case P may be expressed as P = 2k + 1 for some k ∈ N. The function
f(R) will thus achieve a maximum at
R =
2k + 1− 1
2
= k.
The corresponding maximum number of vote-seats is given by
f(R) =
(k + 1)2
2k + 1
.
P even: In this case P may be expressed as P = 2k for some k ∈ N. The function f(R)
will thus achieve a maximum at two values, namely
R =
2k − 1
2
± 1
2
,
both with a corresponding maximum value of
f(R) =
k + 1
2
. 
Of course, the average number of lost votes will only be the number of vote-seats multiplied
by the quota, that is
f(R)×
(⌊
V
S + 1
⌋
+ 1
)
.
A second simulation was implemented to determine the average number of vote-seats,
as well as the maximum number of vote-seats, and how these values compares to the
theoretical maximum as stated Theorem 2. Once again 6 000 simulation runs (elections)
were simulated to obtain the results.
It may be seen from the data in Figure 2 that the average number of lost votes does not
increase proportionately to the theoretical maximum. Where there is a small number of
parties, the average number of lost votes is very near to the theoretical maximum. As the
number of parties increases, the gap widens between these two variables.
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Figure 2: Average number of vote-seats versus the number of parties. The grey bar represents
the average number of vote-seats and the black bar the maximum number of lost votes found for the
6 000 simulation runs. The white bar gives the theoretical maximum that follows from Theorem 2.
4 Mathematical programming models for seat allocation
The mathematical programming models that we present here use mixed integer program-
ming to minimise the deviation caused by the discrete nature of the seats to be allocated.
Thus, the objective is to ensure that the percentage of the seats allocated is as close as
possible to the actual percentage of votes received. All three approaches in this section
were applied on the actual results of the 1999 and 2004 national elections in South Africa
as verified by the Independent Electoral Commission [7, 8]. For each election there was
one national and nine provincial sets of votes, producing a total of 20 data sets. In the
comparative case study that follows the seat allocations resulting from mathematical pro-
gramming methods are compared to the LRMD, currently used by South Africa, as well
as to the other popular methods used to allocate seats in other countries.
In general the absolute deviation Di for party i is given by
Di =
∣∣∣vi
V
− si
S
∣∣∣ ,
where vi is the number of votes cast for party i, V is the total number of votes cast, si is
the number of seats allocated to party i and S is the total number of seats.
4.1 Minimisation of the maximum absolute deviation
The principle behind this method is to minimise, over all parties, the largest deviation
Dmax = max
i
{Di}
instead of the total deviation. This approach adopts has the same underlying philosophy
as in the case of solving classical matrix games in game theory. The linear programming
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formulation is given by
min z = Dmax
subject to (si
S
)
100−
(vi
V
)
100 ≤ z for all i = 1, . . . , P (9)(vi
V
)
100−
(si
S
)
100 ≤ z for all i = 1, . . . , P (10)
P∑
i=1
si = S (11)
si ≥ 0 and integer (12)
z ≥ 0, (13)
with all the symbols as defined earlier. The objective function minimises the maximum
deviation. Constraint (9) calculates the deviation as the difference between the percentage
of seats allocated and the actual percentage of the party’s vote in the election. Constraint
(10) calculates the deviation when the party’s actual percentage is greater than the al-
located percentage. Together these two constraints result in an absolute value for the
deviation. Constraints (11) and (12) respectively ensure that the number of seats allo-
cated does not exceed the available number of seats and that the number of seats allocated
is indeed integers. A possible problem with this approach is that, although the maximum
deviation is minimised, the total deviation can still be relatively large.
4.2 Minimisation of total deviation
A second approach, to counter the possible problem with the first approach, is to minimise
the total deviation. Here we adopt a goal programming formulation, where a variable
for the negative deviation (ηi > 0) and a variable for the positive deviation (ρi > 0) are
introduced. The sum of both ηi and ρi is then minimised. The mathematical programming
formulation is given by
min z =
P∑
i=1
ηi +
P∑
i=1
ρi
subject to (si
S
)
100 + ηi − ρi =
(vi
V
)
100 for all i = 1, . . . , P
P∑
i
si = S
si ≥ 0 and integer
z ≥ 0,
where all the variables have the same meaning as in §4.1. A possible problem that may
arise in this formulation is that, although the total deviation is minimised, one party could
potentially still incur a relatively large deviation.
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4.3 Quadratic goal programming
A quadratic goal programming model may be used to address the potential problems in
the models presented in §4.1 and §4.2. In the quadratic programming approach the total
deviation, as well as the sum of each party’s deviation, is squared and weighted in the
objective function. By taking the square, the model penalises the bigger deviations more
than the smaller deviations and would thus avoid large deviations and minimise the total
deviation at the same time. The mathematical programming formulation is given by
min v = w1z2 + w2
(
P∑
i=1
ηi +
P∑
i=1
ρi
)2
subject to (si
S
)
100 + ηi − ρi =
(vi
V
)
100 for all i = 1, . . . , P
ηi ≤ z for all i = 1, . . . , P
ρi ≤ z for all i = 1, . . . , P
P∑
i
si = S
si ≥ 0 and integer
z ≥ 0,
where w1 and w2 are the weights and the remainder of the variables have the same meaning
as previously.
5 A comparative case study for South Africa
The mathematical programming approaches presented in the previous section were applied
to the actual votes cast in South Africa. All three mathematical models yield the same
result in all the data sets used. The 20 data sets used consist of the elections for 9
provincial governments and the national government in the 1999 [7] and 2004 [8] elections.
The performances of the mathematical programming models (MPM) were tested for all
the sets of data against that of LRMD and the other popular allocation methods. All
three mathematical programming models gave exactly the same results for all the sets of
data. The total absolute deviation was used as a measure to compare the mathematical
models against the other methods. Similar results follow if other measures available in
the literature, such as the Rae index, Loosemore-Handy index, least squares or maximum
deviation [10, 13] are used instead. A method with a lower total absolute deviation
is thus considered to yield a better seat allocation than a method with a higher total
absolute deviation. The total absolute deviations for the seat allocations resulting from
the different allocation methods for all the voting districts participating in the 1999 and
2004 national elections in South Africa are summarised in Tables 6 and 7. The same
results are demonstrated graphically in Figure 3.
In all cases the total absolute deviation of the mathematical models was less than or
equal to that of LRMD (see Figure 3). Additionally, as shown in Tables 6 and 7, the
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District MPM LRMD H SL MSL LRMH
National 1.078 1.078 2.546 1.078 1.419 1.078
Eastern Cape 3.498 3.498 7.732 3.498 5.507 3.498
Free State 11.444 12.686 19.535 12.686 16.196 11.444
Gauteng 4.551 4.551 12.384 4.689 4.689 4.551
KwaZulu-Natal 3.894 3.894 7.530 7.530 5.030 3.894
Mpumalanga 11.984 11.984 22.818 14.796 14.796 11.984
Northern Cape 10.371 11.423 19.543 11.423 14.652 10.371
Northern Province 7.498 8.098 19.342 8.098 10.302 7.498
North West 10.342 10.342 20.767 13.183 13.183 10.342
Western Cape 6.662 6.662 17.643 8.119 8.119 6.662
Total 71.322 74.216 149.84 85.1 93.893 71.322
Table 6: The total absolute deviations for the allocation of seats using mathematical program-
ming and the different allocation methods for the results of the South African election in 1999.
The following abbreviations are used: MPM for mathematical programming models, LRMD for
Largest remainder method using a Droop quota, H for d’Hondt’s method, SL for Sainte-Lague¨’s
method, MSL for modified Sainte-Lague¨’s method and LRMH for largest remainder method using
a Hare quota.
mathematical programming models yield a smaller total absolute deviation than all of the
other allocation methods mentioned in this paper, with one exception (namely LRMH),
where they give the same deviation. It is worth mentioning that the LR method using
the Hare quota yielded the exact same seat allocation as the mathematical programming
models for the 1999 and 2004 national elections in all 9 provinces as well as for the national
seating. In Table 8 a summary is provided where all the allocation methods were applied
to the votes cast in the Free State province during the 2004 elections. Due to the fact that
all the mathematical programming models arrive at the same seat allocation, only one set
of results is given to represent all three models.
It may be seen in Table 8 that some methods favour the more popular parties and some
favor the less popular parties. These figures tend to support the theory that the d’Hondt
and Modified Sainte-Lague¨ methods are more biased towards the larger parties [11, 14].
Seat allocations based on the Sainte-Lague¨ and LRMD methods yield better proportional
representation, but it is the LR method using the Hare quota and the mathematical
programming models that give the lowest overall total absolute deviation. Hence, these
last two models are the fairest for this example. This pattern repeats itself in all the
other provinces as well. These results are in line with the findings of similar experimental
studies done elsewhere in the world [9, 14].
Another interesting pattern (see Figure 3) that arises for this data set is that the total
absolute deviation increases as the number of seats decreases. In the study by Schuster
et al. (2003) the same result is experimentally and formally deduced if the Hare quota,
instead of the Droop quota, is used.
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District MPM LRMD H SL MSL LRMH
National 1.531 1.533 3.008 2.464 1.964 1.531
Eastern Cape 5.406 7.092 10.855 5.406 9.052 5.406
Free State 11.4 14.04 18.17 14.04 18.17 11.4
Gauteng 4.069 5.05 11.11 4.07 6.68 4.069
KwaZulu-Natal 4.781 4.781 10.327 5.949 9.113 4.781
Mpumalanga 9.801 11.87 13.99 13.99 13.99 9.801
Northern Cape 8.805 8.805 15.672 11.91 13.521 8.805
Limpopo 5.256 7.16 12.933 7.16 9.614 5.256
North West 8.835 11 13.271 13.271 13.271 8.835
Western Cape 8.164 9.181 15.68 9.181 9.181 8.164
Total 68.048 80.512 125.016 87.441 104.556 68.048
Table 7: Total absolute deviation for the allocation of seats using the mathematical programming
models and the different allocation methods for the results of the South African election in 2004.
For the abbreviations used refer to Table 6.
6 Conclusion and ideas for further study
In this paper various methods for the allocation of seats in a PR election system were
reviewed. The objective in each is to minimise, for each party, some measure of the devia-
tion between the actual percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats allocated
to that party. This objective served as a criterion to ascertain whether any fair allocation
methods exist. Two categories of allocation methods, namely highest average methods and
largerst remainder methods, were discussed. New mathematical programming approaches
were also introduced by the authors and compared to other existing methods. These new
methods were constructed with the specific objective of minimising the above-mentioned
deviation. All in all, six methods were investigated in a comparative case study based on
actual election results from South Africa’s past two elections.
Currently, South Africa uses the LRMD. For this method it was proved that, in general,
the potential number of seats allocated from the remainders increases as the number of
parties increases. Additionally, a second theorem shows that the number of votes not used
to allocate seats (i.e. “lost votes”) increases with an increase in the number of parties.
Results from simulations supported these theorems. The implication of these theorems
is that an increase in the number of parties will definitely lead to an increase in lost
votes. This fact leads to the conclusion that an increase in the number of parties leads
to an increase in the total absolute deviation, which is also supported by the simulation
runs. An increase in the number of political parties thus leads to an increase in the
disproportionality. Moreover, an increase in the number of parties leads to more votes not
counting towards seat allocation. From a fairness point of view, a decrease in the number
of parties will lead to a more fair allocation.
In the comparative case study, where the seat allocations of six models were compared
to each other, the mathematical programming models yielded the lowest total absolute
deviation out of all the allocation methods, as expected (with the exception of LRMH
which produced the same deviation). This result indicates that relatively simple OR
methods may be used to determine more fair allocations than the current methods used
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Figure 3: The total absolute deviation (as a percentage) for the allocation of seats using math-
ematical programming and LRMD. The data for the 1999 and 2004 elections in South Africa were
used. The value in brackets is the total number of seats that must be allocated for that region. The
following abbreviations are used: Nat for national, KZN for KwaZulu Natal, Gaut for Gauteng,
EC for Eastern Cape, NP for Northern Province (Limpopo), WP for Western Cape, NW for North
West, NC for Northern Cape, MP for Mpumalanga and FS for Free State.
around the world. This study also indicated that the largest remainder method using
the Hare quota yields the best seat allocations in the South African context and does
outperform the LRMD that is currently in use.
Previous studies indicated that not all methods are unbiased. Some methods, such as those
of d’Hondt and the Modified Sainte-Lague, amongst others, tend to be biased towards the
more popular parties. The results of the comparative study support this conjecture. The
nature of South Africa’s current political situation is that there is one dominant party,
which logically will receive the most seats. It is therefore in the smaller parties’ best
interest to have an unbiased allocation system, where they deserve their fair share of
representation. In this study only one measure of fairness was used, namely total absolute
deviation. If a method is not fair, it implies that some parties are favoured more and
others are harmed more. This raises the question of how biased certain methods are. The
question arising from this study is how sensitive the bias of allocation methods is to (i) the
number of parties involved and (ii) the relative sizes of the parties. This question leaves
an opportunity for further investigation and studies on this topic.
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